(5) Confessions of a deluded westerner
First, I claim that there are multiple, at times conflicting, concepts of free will in the essays collected in Repetti (2017). Then, I argue that the Buddhist no-self doctrine is problematic, for it undermines the existence of intentional action and, thus, any hope for Buddhist enlightenment. Forthcoming in a Special Issue of the 'Journal of Buddhist Ethics'. Pre-print available on request.
(4) Meditation and the Scope of Mental action (w. Candace L. Upton)
We argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wide range of types of mental action. Current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress the suitability of meditation for this role. Forthcoming in 'Philosophical Psychology'. Pre-print available here.
(3) review of "Rational and Social Agency", Manuel Vargas and Gideon Yaffe, eds.
This impressive collection of essays broadens and refines the extraordinary work devoted to attaining a critical understanding of Michael Bratman’s corpus. Forthcoming in the 'Journal of Moral Philosophy'. Available here.
(2) Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action
I defend a non-reductive solution to the problem of action, using the notions of agent causation and exerting effort to explain how you make your body move when acting. In the 'Canadian Journal of Philosophy'. Available here.
(1) Understanding Strength of Will
I argue that Richard Holton's account of strength of will falls short, and suggest that it can be improved by including a more substantial role for exerting effort. In 'New Advances in Causation, Agency, and Moral Responsibility' (Bacchini, Dell'Utri & Caputo, eds.) Available here.