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Work-in-Progress

 

Work in Progress

Titles modified to protect blind review.  Contact me for drafts.

 

Mental Action & the Conscious Mind (Routledge, UK)

An edited volume, forthcoming in May 2019. (0) Introduction, by Michael Brent. (1) Skepticism about Self-Understanding, by Matthew Boyle. (2) Agent Causation and Inference, by David Hunter. (3) The Most General Mental Act, by Yair Levy. (4) Are Our Practical Decisions Mental Actions?, by Alfred R. Mele. (5) Practical Rationality and the Problem of Agency, by Joshua Shepherd. (6) Reasoning and the Metaphysics of the Active Mind, by Markos Valaris. (7) Attention and Self-Control, by Sebastian Watzl. (8) Modeling the Causal Efficacy of Mental Action, by Holly Andersen. (9) Reducing Two-Way Powers, by Andrei Buckareff. (10) Embodied Cognition and the Causal Roles of the Mental, by Lisa Miracchi. (11) How to Think Many Thoughts at Once: Content Plurality in Mental Action, by Antonia Peacocke. (12) Spontaneity in Action: Mind Wandering, Cognitive Agency, and Mental Autonomy Across the Sleep-Wake Cycle, by Jennifer M. Windt. (13) Movements of the Mind, by Wayne Wu.

Mental Action & the Metaphysics of Consciousness

I provide an account of mental action that aims to explain how you control what happens in consciousness, and argue that mental action has a place among the fundamental ontological categories required to explain consciousness.

Knowing What We Are Doing (co-authored)

We respond to Blomberg & Brozzo (2017)’s objection to Valaris (2015), on the grounds that their argument depends on an unduly restrictive conception of what form our knowledge of our own intentional actions must take.

You Are Not an Event Are You? 

This paper presents a new version of the problem of the disappearing agent and argues against the standard story of action on the grounds that you are a specific kind of conscious living organism, rather than an event.

The Self in Self-Control

This paper argues that Chandra Sripada's 'divided mind’ account of synchronic strength of will undermines both the sense in which action belongs to you, the agent, and the sense in which displays of strength of will are intentional actions.